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J. Clark Kelso- and Brigitte A. Bass**
BALLOT QUALIFICATION, CONSTITUTIONALITY
AND RETROACTIVITY
People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 262, 667 P.2d 149, 152, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 692, 695 (1983).
The declared purpose of Proposition 8 is the deterrence of
crime, and the only crimes it can deter are those committed
after its adoption; thus, Proposition 8 applies only to
prosecutions for crimes committed on or after its effective
date.
Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d 200, 201, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 100, 101 (1982).
Proposition 8 is ordered placed upon the June 1982 ballot.
The following provisions of Proposition 8 have not been interpreted by reported California
decisions: California Penal Code sections 25(c) (evidence at sentencing) and 3043 (victims right to
comment (adult prisons)); California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6331 (abolition of
provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code dealing with Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders), 1767
(victims right to comment (Youth Authority)) and 1732.5 (prohibition against adults in California
Youth Authority).
The authors have undertaken a survey of current and former government officials deeply
involved in the criminal justice system concerning Proposition 8's impact on case-law. The results
of that survey will be published in an upcoming issue of Prosecutor's Brief, published by the
California District Attorneys Association.
Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I would
like to acknowledge the help of my research assistants in the preparation of this compilation: Jennifer
Anderson, Joan Medeiros and Jill Malat.
.'. Director of Legal Publications, California District Attorneys Association. I want to thank
my research assistant, Cathy Kamezis, for her assistance in the preparation of material for this
compilation.
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Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 261, 651 P.2d 274, 289, 186
Cal. Rptr. 30, 45 (1982).
Proposition 8 is upheld against a number of constitutional
attacks, including allegations that it: (1) Violates the single
subject rule; (2) violates the proscription against using
initiatives to accomplish constitutional revision; and (3)
impairs an essential governmental function.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 28(A), CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
GENERAL DECLARATION OF PURPOSE
AND RIGHTS OF VICTIMS
Dix v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 442, 452-53, 807 P.2d 1063,
1067, 279 Cal. Rptr. 834, 838 (1991).
Section 28(a) does not create a personal "right" or
"interest" which would permit a victim to intervene in an
ongoing criminal proceeding to contest a section 1170(d)
hearing.
In Re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 890 n.10, 694 P.2d 744, 755 n.10,
210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 642 n.10 (1985).
Relies upon the "broad reform" language in section 28(a)
to support overturning cases which had created an
exclusionary rule under the state constitution that was
broader than required by the federal constitution.
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CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 28(B)
RIGHT TO RESTITUTION
People v. Wardlow, 227 Cal. App. 3d 360, 370-71, 278 Cal. Rptr.
1, 6 (1991).
The defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution to an
entity that had an independent obligation to pay for the
treatment of the victim's injuries incurred as a result of the
assault. Only the direct and actual victims of an assault are
within the restitutionary condition of probation authorized
by Health and Safety Code section 1203.1g.
People v. Ryan, 203 Cal. App. 3d 189, 195, 249 Cal. Rptr. 750,
754 (1988).
For an order of restitution as a condition of probation to
satisfy the requirements of due process, the defendant must
have an opportunity to present evidence on the defendant's
ability to pay.
Dixon v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 3d 758, 765, 240 Cal. Rptr.
897, 901 (1987).
Restitution for crime victims is now a California state
constitutional right.
People v. Isaias Vega-Hernandez, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1084, 1099,
225 Cal. Rptr. 209, 218 (1986).
Because section 28(b) directs the Legislature to adopt
implementing legislation, and because that constitutional
provision does not so completely define the nature of the
right it newly confers, nor the means of enforcing that right
so as to render the directive to the Legislature insignificant,
section 28(b) is not a self-executing provision.
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CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 28(C)
RIGHT TO SAFE SCHOOLS
Clausing v. U.S.F. Unified School District, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1224,
1237-38, 271 Cal. Rptr. 72, 78-79 (1990).
The safe schools provision of Proposition 8 does not
impose an express affirmative duty on any government
agency to guarantee the safety of schools. Although the
right proclaimed in section 28(c) is inalienable and
mandatory, it is not self executing in the sense that 28(c)
does not provide an independent basis for a private right of
action. The means by which the right is to be achieved has
been left to the Legislature.
Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448,
1456, 249 Cal. Rptr. 688, 692 (1988).
The safe schools provision is not self-executing and does
not create a damage remedy for its violation.
In Re Frederick B., 192 Cal. App. 3d 79, 85-86, 237 Cal. Rptr.
338, 342 (1987).
Recognizing students' right to safe schools as a factor in
evaluating a fourth amendment challenge to the detention of
a high school student.
Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., 186 Cal. App. 3d
707, 722, 230 Cal. Rptr. 823, 832 (1986).
In enacting Penal Code section 627 the Legislature was
implementing the provisions of Proposition 8; thus, section
627 was not to be given retroactive effect.
In Re William G, 40 Cal. 3d 550, 574, 709 P.2d 1287, 1302, 221
Cal. Rptr. 118, 133 (1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Recognizing that students have a constitutional right to
protection from crime and that students are entitled to safe
schools.
1290
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Halliman v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 163 Cal. App. 3d 46,
52, 209 Cal. Rptr. 175, 178 (1984).
The right to safe schools provision of the Victims' Bill of
Rights did not create an exception to the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Laws.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 28(D)
ADMISSIBILITY OF ALL RELEVANT EVIDENCE
People v. Sullivan, 234 Cal. App. 3d 56, 63, 285 Cal. Rptr. 553,
558 (1991).
Vehicle Code section 40803(a) (rendering evidence derived
from a speed trap inadmissible) was abrogated by
Proposition 8.
People v. Wheeler, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1406, 281 Cal. Rptr. 758, 762
(1991), review granted, 815 P.2d 304, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991),
reprinted for tracking, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1388 (1991).
People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1989), held that section 28(d) has abrogated the
general rule of inadmissibility, i.e. Evidence Code section
787; therefore, the specific exception to the general rule,
i.e., Evidence Code section 788, cannot remain in a vacuum
and must also have been abrogated by section 28(d). Thus,
relevant evidence may include misdemeanor convictions
which satisfy the moral turpitude test of People v. Castro,
38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
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People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 972 n.1, 800 P.2d 516, 541 n.1,
275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 186 n.1 (1990) (Mosk, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 134 (1991).
Because the offenses charged in this case occurred after the
addition of section 28(d) to the state constitution, the
voluntariness of the defendant's Miranda waiver and
subsequent confession must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence as required by People v.
Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 775 P.2d 1042, 260 Cal. Rptr.
273 (1989).
In Re Christopher B., 219 Cal. App. 3d 455, 460 n.2, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 8, 11 n.2 (1990).
In analyzing whether an encounter is a detention, the
federal standard, analyzing the objective facts of the
incident, is the appropriate standard. After the adoption of
Proposition 8, the subjective belief of the citizen analysis,
as set out in In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957,
148 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1978), no longer applies.
People v. Boyd, 222 Cal. App. 3d 541, 562-63, 271 Cal. Rptr. 738,
751-52 (1990).
Proposition 8 abrogates the judicially declared rule of
criminal procedure contained within People v. Aranda, 63
Cal.2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965), to the
extent it requires the exclusion of evidence which would
not be excluded by the federal constitution.
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People v. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d 1, 7, 784 P.2d 633, 635, 265
Cal. Rptr. 690, 693 (1990).
Section 28(d) itself does not limit a defendant's discovery
rights under People v. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 216
Cal. Rptr. 477 (1985) (holding that a criminal defendant is
entitled to discovery of police records and other documents
concerning the background of a confidential informant on
whose information a search warrant was issued, provided
the documents were first screened by the court in camera to
protect the informant's confidentiality).
People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 1234, 767 P.2d 1047, 1065,
255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 588 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990).
Although Proposition 8 was enacted after the crimes were
committed, and thus was not applicable to the case, section
28(d) would compel the finding that California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), supersedes People v.
Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1974).
People v. Lankford, 210 Cal. App. 3d 227,240,258 Cal. Rptr. 322,
329 (1989).
The adoption of Proposition 8 had no affect on Evidence
Code section 352.
People v. Trotman, 214 Cal. App. 3d 430, 432, 262 Cal. Rptr. 640,
641 (1989).
People v. Superior Court (Hawkins), 6 Cal. 3d 757, 493
P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972), is abrogated by
Proposition 8.
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People v. Deltoro, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1417, 1425, 263 Cal. Rptr.
305, 310 (1989).
The rule of People v. Superior Court (Hawkins), 6 Cal. 3d
757, 493 P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972) (the taking
of a person's blood is valid only if the taking is done in a
medically approved manner, is incident to a lawful arrest,
and is based upon the reasonable belief that the person is
intoxicated) has been abrogated by Proposition 8 because its
holding is contrary to federal constitutional standards.
People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1081-82, 767 P.2d 619, 640,
255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 373 (1989).
Section 28(d) effected a pro tanto repeal of California
Evidence Code section 790, and there is no basis on which
to distinguish section 790 from sections 786 and 787.
People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 71, 775 P.2d 1042, 1047, 260
Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (1989).
Section 28(d) abrogated the rule in People v. Jimenez, 21
Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978)
(requiring proof of the voluntariness of a confession beyond
a reasonable doubt). Voluntariness may now be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence.
People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1152 n.16, 783 P.2d 698, 707
n.16, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 120 n.16 (1989).
Suggesting that section 28(d) does not affect the
admissibility of professional/expert testimony pursuant to
the Kelly/Frye rule or California Evidence Code sections
210, 801, and 1102. The parties and the lower courts have
assumed that these prior rules remain intact in the wake of
section 28(d).
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People v. Ford, 45 Cal. 3d 431, 448, 754 P.2d 168, 178, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 121, 132 (1988).
Article 1, section 28(d) clearly reflects a policy that
comments which invite the jury to draw a logical inference
based on the state of the evidence, including comment on
the failure of the defendant to call available witnesses, are
permissible except as limited by California Evidence Code
section 913 and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 318-19 748 P.2d 307, 312, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 374-75 (1988).
The enactment of section 28(d) repealed the exclusionary
rule set forth in People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545
P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (barring the use of
statements to the police if they were obtained in violation
of the accused's Miranda rights). In adopting section 28(d)
and its exception to the statutory rules of evidence, the
voters intended to preserve only legislatively created
evidentiary rules, while abrogating judicial decisions which
had required the exclusion of evidence solely on state
constitutional grounds.
People v. Moore, 201 Cal. App. 3d 877, 885, 247 Cal. Rptr. 353,
357-58 (1988).
The unqualified holding in People v. Belleci, 24 Cal. 3d
879, 598 P.2d 473, 157 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979) (evidence
suppressed pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 is
inadmissible at any trial or hearing), must be modified to
include the qualification that evidence is inadmissible only
if exclusion is mandated by the federal constitution.
People v. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 1495, 247 Cal. Rptr.
854, 863-64 (1988).
The defendant's right to discovery under California law is
not contravened by Proposition 8.
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People v. Warner, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1122, 1129, 250 Cal. Rptr.
462, 466 (1988).
For crimes committed after the enactment of Proposition 8,
the standard for the admissibility of statements given to the
police by a suspect who previously invoked his right to
remain silent is that of federal constitutional law under
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Proposition 8
effectively abrogated the rule in People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal.
3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978).
People v. Ledesma, 204 Cal. App. 3d 682, 691, 251 Cal. Rptr. 417,
421 (1988).
Because the rule of People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724
P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986) (excluding statements
given by suspects unaware that their attorney had come to
the police station seeking to confer with them), is a
judicially fashioned exclusionary rule premised on neither
statutory authority nor federal constitutional compulsion, it
has been repealed by section 28(d).
In Re J. Clyde K., 192 Cal. App. 3d 710, 717, 237 Cal. Rptr. 550,
553-54 (1987).
Section 28(d) did not modify the law which permitted a
defendant to exclude another's coerced confession and
evidence gathered as a result of that confession.
People v. Scott, 194 Cal. App. 3d 550, 554, 239 Cal. Rptr. 588,
590 (1987).
The validity of Evidence Code section 1101, which
determines the admissibility of uncharged criminal offenses,
is unimpaired by section 28(d) because it was subsequently
reenacted and made enforceable by a two-thirds vote of the
Legislature.
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Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 810, 693 P.2d 789,
794, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204, 210 (1985).
Notwithstanding section 28(d), both testimony given by a
minor at a fitness hearing and statements made to a
probation officer are subject to use immunity and may not
be used at a subsequent trial for a criminal offense.
In Re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 890, 694 P.2d 744, 754, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 631, 642 (1985).
Proposition 8 eliminates the judicially created vicarious
exclusionary rule for violations of the search and seizure
provisions contained within the state constitution.
People v. Weaver, 39 Cal. 3d 654, 660, 703 P.2d 1139, 1142, 217
Cal. Rptr. 245, 249 (1985).
People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120
Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975) (excluding probation revocation
hearing testimony during a subsequent trial on the
underlying criminal charge) and its limited exclusionary
remedy have survived the adoption of Proposition 8.
People v. Johnson, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1008, 209 Cal. Rptr.
78, 80 (1985).
Section 28(d) abolished the state's judicially created
vicarious exclusionary rule.
People v. Armbruster, 163 Cal. App. 3d 660, 665, 210 Cal. Rptr.
11, 14 (1985).
Section 28(d) does not repeal Penal Code section 1112,
which prohibits a trial court from ordering the victim in a
sexual assault prosecution to submit to a psychiatric or
psychological examination for the purpose of assessing his
or her credibility.
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People v. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d 889, 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. 819,
822-23 (1985).
People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 360 (1976) is predicated on article I, section 15 of the
state constitution, and has not been rendered a nullity by
enactment section 28(d). In fact Disbrow remains a
statutory exemption to the provisions of section 28(d).
People v. Foreman, 174 Cal. App. 3d 175, 181, 219 Cal. Rptr. 759,
763 (1985).
The rule from People v. Barrick, 33 Cal. 3d 115, 654 P.2d
1243, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1982) (the "sanitization" of
similar felony convictions for impeachment purposes is
improper because of the inherent danger of jury
speculation), does not survive Proposition 8; instead the
factor analysis from People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492
P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972) is appropriate.
People v. Daan, 161 Cal. App. 3d 22, 31, 207 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233
(1984).
Section 28(d) abrogated California's vicarious exclusionary
rule.
1298
1992 / Significant Cases Interpreting Proposition 8
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 28(E)
PUBLIc SAFETY BAL
Williams v. County of San Joaquin, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1326, 1333,
275 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1990).
The fact that the district attorney's office is not given notice
and an opportunity to participate in decisions to grant own-
recognizance releases prior to court appearances does not
violate the "Public Safety Bail" provisions of section
28(e). Prior release notice to the prosecuting attorney is
required only where the detainee is accused of committing
a violent felony.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 28(F)
USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR IMPEACHMENT
People v. Collins, 42 Cal. 3d 378, 383, 722 P.2d 173, 175, 228
Cal. Rptr. 899, 902 (1986).
Prospectively adopting the rule in Luce v. United States,
469 U.S. 38 (1984), that the denial of a motion to exclude
a prior conviction offered for impeachment is not
reviewable on appeal if the defendant fails to testify.
People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 312-13, 696 P.2d 111, 117, 211
Cal. Rptr. 719, 725 (1985).
Section 28(f) authorizes the impeachment of a witness in a
criminal trial by a prior felony conviction that necessarily
involves moral turpitude. However, the trial court retains its
discretionary power under Evidence Code section 352 to
exclude any prior felony conviction when its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue
prejudice.
1299
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People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29, 54 n.8, 711 P.2d 423, 437 n.8,
222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 142 n.8 (1985).
Section 28(f) cannot be retroactively applied to the
prosecution of crimes committed before its effective date.
People v. Valentine, 42 Cal. 3d 170, 173, 720 P.2d 913, 913, 228
Cal. Rptr. 25, 26 (1985).
The "proof in open court" provision of Proposition 8
overrules People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826, 167
Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980), to the extent Hall precludes
disclosure of stipulated ex-felon status to a jury trying a
charge as to which this status is an element. On the other
hand, Proposition 8 does not require the nature of the prior
conviction to go to the jury in such a case, since that
information is utterly irrelevant to the charge. Thus,
disclosure of the nature of the prior conviction remains
error in post-Proposition 8 trials.
People v. Sanchez, 170 Cal. App. 3d 216, 218, 216 Cal. Rptr. 21,
23 (1985).
Section 28(f), by its terms, precludes the use of a juvenile
adjudication for impeachment. Juvenile adjudication is a
civil proceeding; the fact that due process requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that criminal rules of
evidence be utilized, does not render the adjudication a
criminal proceeding. A juvenile's delinquency may consist
of felony activity, but a juvenile adjudication of felonious
activity is not a felony conviction.
1300
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CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 28(F)-(G)
AND PENAL CODE, SECTION 667(A)
USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR
PUNISHMENT ENHANCEMENT
People v. McClanahan, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1321, 1323, 281 Cal.
Rptr. 847, 848 (1991)
Concluding that People v. Vega, 224 Cal. App. 3d 506, 273
Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990) (which held that a Penal Code section
12022.1 "on bail" enhancement must be imposed without
the double-the-base-term limitation of Penal Code section
1170.1(g)), was incorrectly decided, and that the trial court
erred in imposing a sentence which disregarded the double-
base-term limitation of section 1170.1(g).
Curl v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 1292, 1300 n.5, 801 P.2d 292,
296 n.5, 276 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53 n.5 (1991).
If section 28(f) is read to require that a prior conviction,
underlying a prior-murder special-circumstances allegation,
be proven to the trier of fact in court, the court will
similarly determine that provision as requiring only that the
fact or truth of the prior conviction be determined by the
trier of fact.
People v. Prather, 50 Cal. 3d 428, 440, 787 P.2d 1012, 1019, 267
Cal. Rptr. 605, 613 (1990).
The enactment of section 28(f) (prior felony convictions to
be used without limitation for enhancement purposes), was
an unambiguous expression of the electorate's intent to
supersede the twice-the-base-term limitation as it applied to
prior-felony-conviction enhancements. Further, the broad
mandate of Section 28(f), concerning the use of any prior
felony conviction for enhancement purposes, necessarily
includes the lesser category of enhancements based on prior
felony convictions for which imprisonment was imposed,
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and thus applies to the enhancements created by Penal Code
section 667.5(b).
People v. Johnson, 217 Cal. App. 3d 978, 984-85, 266 Cal. Rptr.
221, 224-25 (1990).
It was sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's
admission of a prior felony when the prosecution produced
a felony complaint charging second degree burglary of a
residence, a commitment order holding defendant to answer
for burglary, an information alleging residential burglary, an
abstract of judgment reflecting a 16-month jail sentence, a
transcript of the defendant's plea of guilty, and the minute
orders.
People v. Gomez, 219 Cal. App. 3d 157, 160, 268 Cal. Rptr. 50, 51
(1990).
The trial court may look to the information and the abstract
of judgment when determining whether a prior conviction
was a serious felony.
People v. Castellanos, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1163, 1170, 269 Cal. Rptr.
93, 97 (1990).
The trial court may review the transcript of the preliminary
hearing for the prior conviction, as part of the entire record
of conviction, in order to determine whether the prior
conviction is a "serious felony."
People v. Williams, 222 Cal. App. 3d 911, 918, 272 Cal. Rptr. 212,
216 (1990).
In imposing an enhanced sentence, the trial court's reliance
on a triple hearsay statement located in a probation report,
regarding the defendant's use of a dangerous weapon, was
error.
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People v. Ratcliff, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1401, 1405-07, 273 Cal. Rptr.
253, 256-57 (1990).
When the defendant failed to stipulate to a prior conviction,
court could admit evidence of both prior conviction and its
nature.
People v. Gonzales, 220 Cal. App. 3d 134, 140, 269 Cal. Rptr. 221,
224-25 (1990).
The trial court properly enhanced the defendant's sentence
for two prior convictions for residential burglary, even
though they were adjudicated in one proceeding.
People v. Vega, 224 Cal. App. 3d 506, 520, 273 Cal. Rptr. 684,
692 (1990).
"On bail" sentence enhancements under Penal Code
section 12022.1 are imposed for prior felony convictions,
and pursuant to Proposition 8, section 28(f), must be
imposed without limitation to the double-the-base-term
limitation of Penal Code section 1170.1(g).
People v. Burnes, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1222, 1231, 274 Cal. Rptr.
466, 471 (1990).
In light of both People v. Prather, 50 Cal. 3d 428, 787 P.2d
1012, 267 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990) (directing that section 28(f)
be given a liberal and common sense interpretation), and
the fact that the legislative intent underlying Penal Code
section 12022.1 precisely comports with the underlying
purpose of section 28(f), the Penal Code section 12022.1
"on bail" enhancements are, in essence, "prior felony
conviction" enhancements as that latter phrase is
interpreted and defined under section 28(f).
1303
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People v. Reynolds, 211 Cal. App. 3d 382, 388-89, 390, 259 Cal.
Rptr. 352, 356-57, 358 (1989).
Trial court may not enhance the defendant's sentence when
the record of a prior conviction does not establish the
necessary elements of the serious felony, but merely refers
to the included offense of the crime charged. The
Prosecution may, without subjecting the defendant to double
jeopardy, prove on remand that the prior convictions were
serious felonies.
People v. Garcia, 216 Cal. App. 3d 233, 236-38, 264 Cal. Rptr.
662, 664-65 (1989).
The trial court may refer to statements made by the
defendant in probation report for purposes of determining
whether the prior convictions were serious felonies. For
purposes of sentence enhancement, the terms "residence"
and "inhabited dwelling house" are equivalent, and cannot
be differentiated for first degree burglary.
People v. Rhoden, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1242, 1255-58, 265 Cal. Rptr.
355, 362-63 (1989).
The trial court erred in enhancing the defendant's sentence
for a prior conviction in another state when it could not be
determined whether that offense constituted a felony in
California.
In Re Harris, 49 Cal. 3d 131, 136-37, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060, 260
Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1989).
The phrase "on charges brought and tried separately" in
section 667 requires that the charges underlying the prior
"serious felony" convictions must have been made in
proceedings that were formally distinct.
1304
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People v. Karis, 46 Cal. 3d 612, 639-40, 758 P.2d 1189, 1204, 250
Cal. Rptr. 659, 674 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 (1989).
Noting that People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826,
167 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980), had been abrogated by section
28(f).
People v. WVoodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1014, 741 P.2d 154, 160,
239 Cal. Rptr. 656, 662 (1987).
The statutory context of Proposition 8 provides the only
clear, direct, and compelling evidence of the intended scope
of section 1732.5. When read in conjunction with Penal
Code section 667, the reference in section 1732.5 to persons
"convicted" of serious felonies must be construed to refer
exclusively to persons who currently stand convicted of
serious felonies.
People v. Martinez, 175 Cal. App. 3d 881, 890, 221 Cal. Rptr. 258,
262 (1986).
The enactment of Proposition 8 did not eliminate the trial
court's power, under Penal Code section 1385, to strike the
enhancement provisions in Penal Code section 667.
People v. Jackson, 37 Cal. 3d 826, 835, 838, 694 P.2d 736, 741,
743, 210 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628, 630 (1985).
Proposition 8 did not intend to define a crime intermediate
between first and second degree burglary, "burglary of a
residence." Instead, it creates a new enhancement under
which persons convicted of first or second degree burglary
could receive an additional sentence. Additionally,
enhancements for serious felonies under Penal Code section
667 were not intended to be subject to the double-base-term
limitation of section 1170.1(g).
1305
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People v. Fritz, 40 Cal. 3d 227, 230-31, 707 P.2d 833, 834, 219
Cal. Rptr. 460, 462 (1985).
Neither Penal Code section 667 nor California Constitution
article I, section 28(f) can be construed to abrogate a trial
court's well-established statutory authority to strike a prior
conviction.
People v. Wigham, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1161, 1169, 205 Cal. Rptr.
227, 232 (1984).
The double-the-base term limitation of Penal Code section
1170.1(g) was not eliminated by section 28(f). However, a
court retains the discretion to strike or stay the imposition
of a sentence under Penal Code section 667(a).
People v. Tipton, 160 Cal. App. 3d 853, 855, 206 Cal. Rptr. 821,
822 (1984).
The requirement of a bifurcated trial under People v.
Bracamonte, 119 Cal. App. 3d 644, 174 Cal. Rptr. 191
(1981), was not affected by Proposition 8.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 28(G)
AND PENAL CODE SECTION 1192.7
PLEA BARGAINING AND SERIOUS FELONIES
People v. Irvin, 230 Cal. App. 3d 180, 191-92, 281 Cal. Rptr. 195,
202 (1991).
Unless the sentencing court states its reasons for striking
the enhancement by finding mitigating circumstances, it is
required to impose a Penal Code section 667.5 enhancement
if the allegation of prior conviction is found true.
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People v. Bouzas, 53 Cal. 3d 467, 479, 807 P.2d 1076, 1085, 279
Cal. Rptr. 847, 855 (1991).
Section 666 of the Penal Code is a sentence-enhancing
statute and not a substantive offense statute; therefore, a
defendant charged under section 666 is on notice that if an
allegation of prior incarceration and/or conviction is found
true, the defendant faces an enhanced sentence.
People v. Rhoads, 221 Cal. App. 3d 56, 61, 270 Cal. Rptr. 266,
269 (1990)
"Conviction" means ascerta'iment of guilt by plea or
verdict, there is no distinction of legal significance between
the two despite the fact that the plea may be withdrawn.
People v. Burton, 48 Cal. 3d 843, 862, 771 P.2d 1270, 1283, 258
Cal. Rptr. 184, 197 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1039 (1990).
Noting that People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d 343, 748 P.2d
1150, 243 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1988), had overruled People v.
Alfaro, 42 Cal. 3d 627, 724 P.2d 1154, 230 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1986).
In re Harris, 49 Cal. 3d 131, 136-37, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060, 260
Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1989).
A trial court may not enhance a defendant's sentence for
two prior convictions when the two prior convictions were
filed in a single complaint.
People v. Valencia, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1042, 1046-47, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 180, 183 (1989)
A trial court lacks discretion under Penal Code section 667
to order terms to be served concurrently rather than
consecutively.
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People v. Harrell, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1439, 1444-45, 255 Cal. Rptr.
750, 753 (1989).
For sentence enhancement purposes, a trial court may look
not only to the charging information the for prior
conviction, but also to a minute order in which the
defendant had plead no contest to a burglary.
People v. Johnson, 208 Cal. App. 3d 19, 24-25, 256 Cal. Rptr. 16,
18-19 (1989).
The trial court may look to the allegations in the
information charging second degree burglary even though
the residential nature of the burglary was not part of the
prior conviction.
People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d 343, 345, 748 P.2d 1150, 1150, 243
Cal. Rptr. 688, 688 (1988).
The trier of fact may look to the entire record of a prior
conviction for purposes of sentence enhancements: People
v. Alfaro, 42 Cal. 3d 627, 724 P.2d 1154, 230 Cal. Rptr.
129 (1986), is overruled.
People v. Colbert, 198 Cal. App. 3d 924, 930, 244 Cal. Rptr. 98,
102 (1988).
For purposes of sentence enhancement a trier of fact may
look to the accusatory pleadings and relevant court
documents to determine the truth of a prior-conviction
allegation.
People v. Batista, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1288, 1292-95, 248 Cal. Rptr.
46, 49-50 (1988).
The trial court may look at official court files to determine
whether a prior conviction of second degree burglary, to
which the defendant has plead nolo contendre, was a
serious felony for purposes of sentence enhancement.
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People v. Carr, 204 Cal. App. 3d 774, 777-79, 251 Cal. Rptr. 458,
459-60 (1988).
The trial court may use the defendant's change of plea form
in order to go behind the record of a prior conviction.
People v. Smith, 206 Cal. App. 3d 340, 345, 253 Cal. Rptr. 522,
525 (1988).
The trial court may consider facts on the record of a prior
conviction, even if those facts were not essential to that
conviction.
People v. Medina, 206 Cal. App. 3d 986, 990, 254 Cal. Rptr. 89,
92 (1988)
A defendant probationer who has never served prison time
may have his sentence enhanced under Penal Code section
667.
People v. Ellis, 195 Cal. App. 3d 334, 339, 240 Cal. Rptr. 708, 710
(1987).
A defendant cannot admit to a prior conviction for a serious
offense in another jurisdiction when it lacks all of the
elements of that felony under California law.
People v. Webb, 186 Cal. App. 3d 401,409-12, 230 Cal. Rptr. 755,
761-63 (1986).
A defendant cannot claim an erroneous use of Penal Code
section 1192.7 (limitation on plea bargains) to attack his
own conviction on the grounds that it violated section
1192.7.
People v. Gonzales, 188 Cal. App. 3d 586, 590, 233 Cal. Rptr. 204,
206 (1986).
A defendant has no standing to allege a violation of Penal
Code section 1192.7 unless the defendant meets one of the
three exceptions listed under section 1192.7
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People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. 3d 837, 842-44, 718 P.2d 94, 97, 226
Cal. Rptr. 107, 110-12 (1986).
For purposes of sentence enhancement, the defendant's
admission to four previous serious felony convictions was
sufficient, even though the defendant did not admit
specifically to residential burglaries.
People v. Equarte, 42 Cal. 3d 456, 465-67, 722 P.2d 890, 895, 229
Cal. Rptr. 116, 121-23 (1986).
The trial court did not err in concluding that the defendant's
prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon
constituted a "serious felony" for purposes of a five year
sentence enhancement. The people may not go behind an
adjudicated element of a prior conviction in the absence of
a valid admission by the defendant.
People v. Alfaro, 42 Cal. 3d 627, 632-35, 724 P.2d 1154, 1157,
230 Cal. Rptr. 129, 132-34 (1986).
Proof that the prior conviction was a "serious felony" was
limited to matters necessarily established by the prior
conviction. A court may not go beyond the fact of the prior
conviction.
People v. O'Bryan, 37 Cal. 3d 841, 844-45, 694 P.2d 135, 136, 210
Cal. Rptr. 450, 452-53 (1985).
For purposes of a sentence enhancement, the defendant's
prior conviction for "burglary of residence" was a serious
offense, even though he entered the inhabited portion of a
nonresidential building. Thus, a plea of nolo contendre to
second-degree burglary of a residence was sufficient for
sentence enhancement, although entry into a residence was
not an element of that crime.
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People v. Cardoza, 161 Cal. App. 3d 40, 45-46, 207 Cal. Rptr.
388, 392 (1984).
Penal Code section 1192.7, which generally prohibits plea
bargains in cases involving "serious felonies," does not
prohibit a plea bargain which would not result in a
substantial change in sentence, even had the case been tried.
PENAL CODE, SECTION 25(A)
DIMINISHED CAPACITY
People v. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 820 P.2d 588, 593, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 364, 369 (1991).
Amendments to the Penal Code, including section 25(a),
have abolished the defense of diminished capacity.
People v. McAlroy, 230 Cal. App. 3d 782, 786, 271 Cal. Rptr. 335,
336 (1990), review granted, 798 P.2d 1213, 274 Cal. Rptr. 370
(1990), reprinted for tracking, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1247 (1991), review
dismissed, 1992 WL 39335 (1992).
The court in People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119, 202
Cal. Rptr. 663 (1984), held that with the abrogation of
diminished capacity through Proposition 8, the Legislature
"eliminated the judicially created concept of non-statutory
voluntary manslaughter." It only makes sense that one of
the byproducts of diminished capacity, the reduction of
murder to manslaughter due to mental defect, should fall
within the elimination of diminished capacity itself.
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People v. Molina, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1173, 249 Cal. Rptr.
273, 275 (1988).
The apparent meaning of the statutory language contained
within Penal Code sections 25(a), 28(a) and 29 is that
evidence of mental problems may be admitted to prove that
the defendant lacked the requisite mental state but such
evidence may not be introduced to prove that the defendant
was unable to form the requisite mental state. Expert
testimony may be introduced to show the state of mind of
the defendant, but the expert may not testify as to whether
the defendant had the requisite mental state necessary for
the crime.
People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119, 128, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663,
668 (1984).
As a result of Proposition 8, diminished capacity has been
abolished as a defense to murder.
People v. Olea, 160 Cal. App. 3d 891, 896-97, 206 Cal. Rptr. 829,
832-33 (1984).
As a result of Proposition 8, a defendant may not prove he
was unable to form certain mental states due to intoxication.
Rather, a defendant's intoxication may be introduced into
evidence to allow the trier of fact to determine if the
defendant formed the requisite mental state necessary to
commit the crime.
PENAL CODE, SECTION 25(B)
INsANrrY DEFENSE
People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 883, 931 n.27, 751 P.2d 395 n.27,
426, 245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 368 n.27 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
900 (1988).
Noting that Proposition 8 reinstated the M'Naghten test.
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People v. Czahara, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1468, 1477, 250 Cal. Rptr.
836, 841-42 (1988).
Penal Code section 29, a statutory exception to section
28(d), prohibits expert psychiatric testimony as to whether
the defendant did or did not have a required mental state,
including malice aforethought. Therefore, psychiatric
evidence that the defendant was acting in the heat of
passion and that the ordinarily reasonable person in the
same circumstances would also have acted in passion was
properly excluded.
People v. Stress, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 1272, 1274-75, 252 Cal.
Rptr. 913, 921, 923 (1988).
"Wrong" as the term is used in Penal Code section 25(b)
refers both to legal wrong and moral wrong. In the sanity
context, "wrong" means the violation of generally accepted
standards of moral obligation and not those standards
peculiar to the accused.
People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 768-70, 704 P.2d 752, 753, 217
Cal. Rptr. 685, 686-87 (1985).
Penal Code section 25(b) reinstated the M'Naghten test as
the standard of legal insanity in criminal prosecutions.
People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 368 n. 19, 673 P.2d 680, 705 n. 19,
197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 828 n.19 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892
(1984).
Noting that Penal Code section 25(b) resembled the
M'Naghten test of insanity. However, because Proposition
8 is not to be retroactively applied the court used the
American Law Institute test of insanity.
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PENAL CODE, SECTION 1191.1
VICTIM'S RIGHT TO COMMENT
People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 287, 786 P.2d 892, 906, 266 Cal.
Rptr. 834, 849 (1990).
Victim impact statements which are permitted by section
1191.1 are not to be considered by the court in ruling on a
section 190.4(e) motion.
People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 811-12, 802 P.2d 330, 365, 276
Cal. Rptr. 827, 863 (1990).
The trial court's assumed consideration of statements made
by the relatives of the victims in a Penal Code section
190.4(e) motion is error. However, the trial court's ruling
should be set aside only if the error was prejudicial.
People v. Birmingham, 217 Cal. App. 3d 180, 184-85, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 780, 782-83 (1990).
The court must consider statements made pursuant to Penal
Code section 1191.1 in sentencing the defendant. Because
the victims' statements are made at sentencing hearings
rather than trial, the right to confrontation is not implicated
and hearsay is not a ground for objection.
People v. Sewell, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1447, 1450, 259 Cal. Rptr. 34,
35-36 (1989).
Penal Code section 1191.1 does not violate the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in non-capital
prosecutions.
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People v. Jennings, 46 Cal. 3d 963, 994, 760 P.2d 475, 494, 251
Cal. Rptr. 278, 298 (1988).
Consideration of the victim impact statement by the
sentencing authority is authorized for sentences imposed
under the Determinate Sentencing Act. However, a capital
jury may not consider that kind of "victim impact"
evidence, and a court should not consider such evidence
prior to ruling on a Penal Code section 190.4 motion.
People v. Stringham, 206 Cal. App. 3d 184, 198-99, 253 Cal. Rptr.
484, 492 (1988).
The victim's father had the right to make a statement
objecting to the plea bargain pursuant to Penal Code section
1191.1.
Melissa J. v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 476, 478, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 5, 6 (1987).
Under Penal Code section 1191.1, as to restitution, the
notice and right to appear requirements are mandatory; if
the requirements are not satisfied, the victim may challenge
a ruling regarding restitution.
People v. Huber, 181 Cal. App. 3d 601, 635-36, 227 Cal. Rptr.
113, 133 (1986).
Penal Code section 1191.1 is clearly procedural both in
form and effect and would be applied retroactively as to
prior crimes. There is no Sixth Amendment right to cross
examine victim statements where the statements are read to
the court and given while not under oath.
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People v. Superior Court (Thompson), 154 Cal. App. 3d 319, 321-
22, 202 Cal. Rptr. 585, 586-87 (1984).
California Constitution article 1, section 28 and Penal Code
section 1191.1, are directory, not mandatory, and failure to
notify the victim of a sentencing date did not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction to proceed. Further, the court held
that it lacked the authority to afford relief, since no
procedures to enforce the duty of notification, or remedies
for the failure to do so, are provided in the applicable
constitutional or statutory provisions.
People v. Zikorus, 150 Cal. App. 3d 324, 331, 197 Cal. Rptr. 509,
513 (1983).
Penal Code section 1191.1 was not intended to limit the
information a sentencing court may consider in imposing a
sentence. It only guarantees the victim a right to be heard
and considered.
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